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Recent research has seen a growing interest in connections between domains of spatial
and social cognition. Much evidence indicates that processes of representing space
in distinct frames of reference (FOR) contribute to basic spatial abilities as well as
sophisticated social abilities such as tracking other’s intention and belief. Argument
remains, however, that belief reasoning in social domain requires an innately dedicated
system and cannot be reduced to low-level encoding of spatial relationships. Here we offer
an integrated account advocating the critical roles of spatial representations in intrinsic
frame of reference. By re-examining the results from a spatial task (Tamborello et al.,
2012) and a false-belief task (Onishi and Baillargeon, 2005), we argue that spatial and
social abilities share a common origin at the level of spatio-temporal association and
predictive learning, where multiple FOR-based representations provide the basic building
blocks for efﬁcient and ﬂexible partitioning of the environmental statistics.We also discuss
neuroscience evidence supporting these mechanisms. We conclude that FOR-based
representations may bridge the conceptual as well as the implementation gaps between
the burgeoning ﬁelds of social and spatial cognition.
Keywords: theory of mind, false belief, spatial cognition, frame of reference, predictive learning
INTRODUCTION
Recent research has seen a growing interest in the connections
between two disparate lines of investigations: spatial cognition
that focuses on spatial and bodily representations, and, social
cognition that examines the abilities of attributing other’s inten-
tions and beliefs, namely, theory of mind (TOM). Although
researchers have learned much about the underlying mecha-
nisms in each domain, there are still opposing perspectives
and considerable conceptual gaps between the two domains.
In particular, much contest revolves around the contribution
of domain-speciﬁc spatial processing to domain-general TOM
abilities.
At the center of the debate, is an apparent contradiction
between the ﬁndings that human infants can pass false-belief tasks
(e.g., holding an agent’s belief about the original location of an
object, which has been changed in the absence of the agent) and
the general claim that children ﬁrst understand false-beliefs at
around 4 years of age (for reviews, see,Apperly andButterﬁll, 2009;
Perner et al., 2011; Frith andFrith,2012). Somehave suggested that
sophisticated TOM inferences, as indicated by successfully per-
forming the false-belief tasks, may evolve from a set of low-level
encoding processes, for example, agent-object-location associa-
tions (Perner and Ruffman, 2005; Ruffman and Perner, 2005),
identiﬁcation of “external referent” (Perner et al., 2011), and, spa-
tial perspective taking (Kessler and Rutherford, 2010; Kessler and
Thomson, 2010). Yet other theorists have posited that beliefs are
“invisible abstract entities” (Saxe, 2006), and that making infer-
ences about other’s beliefs requires a dedicated or innate system
that cannot be accounted for by mere associations (Leslie, 2005;
Saxe and Wexler, 2005; Csibra and Southgate, 2006; Baillargeon
et al., 2010).
In the present paper, we attempt to bridge the conceptual
gaps between different perspectives by advocating an integrated
account. We argue that a fundamental spatio-temporal associa-
tion process, which is fraught in the domain of spatial cognition,
is also essential in the domain of social cognition. At the compu-
tational level, spatio-temporal association is to extract statistical
regularities from the task environment by detecting the corre-
lations between representations of events over space and time.
However, spatio-temporal association is not merely about matri-
ces of associative weights that connect different representations in
a static manner. Instead, it takes place over space and time through
the lens of predictive learning. Recent advances in neuroscience
suggest that – at both the algorithmic and neural architectural
levels – it is not reward that drives learning per se, but the tempo-
ral discrepancy between actual and expected outcomes (Gerstner
et al., 2012; O’Reilly et al., 2012). That is, the task environment
constantly changes. At any moment, environmental statistics
present themselves as multimodal inputs to the mind. By con-
stantly comparing the observed and expected outcomes, the mind
selectively re-encodes the raw environmental statistics and trans-
forms them into a hierarchy of representations at different levels
of abstraction, which eventually produce complex behaviors such
as thought, language, and, intelligence (Hawkins and Blakeslee,
2004).
Our approach to understanding the process of spatio-temporal
association utilizes frames of reference (FOR) as the building
blocks of both spatial and social cognition. A growing body of
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research has shown that FOR-based representations are not only
behaviorally plausible but are also supported by the neurological
structures in both human and animal brains. As spatio-temporal
association re-encodes the environmental statistics by remov-
ing task-irrelevant variances (e.g., instability, noise), FOR-based
representations provide a straightforward way of partitioning
spatio-temporal variances. In addition, it has been a central con-
tention that theory-of-mind abilities are subject to competing
demands for efﬁcient and ﬂexible processing and require two dis-
tinct systems, “one that is efﬁcient and inﬂexible and one that is
ﬂexible but cognitively demanding” (Apperly and Butterﬁll, 2009,
p. 957). Instead of focusing on the distinction between different
systems, we emphasize the common representations shared by dif-
ferent sets of abilities and mechanisms. We argue that when people
perform spatial and social tasks, both efﬁciency and ﬂexibility can
emerge from the expectation-driven competition among multiple
FOR-based representations.
INTRINSIC FRAME OF REFERENCE (IFOR) IN SPATIAL
COGNITION
The notion of “FOR” has been crucial to all the disciplines that
study spatial relationships and relies on a diverse terminology for
its classiﬁcation (Levinson, 2004). For example, a conventional
approach is to classify a reference system by its origin: whether it
is anchored to the observer self (e.g., “egocentric”) or the environ-
ment (e.g., “allocentric”; Andersen et al., 1997; Wang and Spelke,
2002; Burgess, 2008). However, we adopt a classiﬁcation sys-
tem that – besides the self-centered egocentric frame of reference
(EFOR) – further differentiates the environment-centric frames
into two categories: allocentric (AFOR, with an absolute and ﬁxed
anchor), and, intrinsic (IFOR, with a relative and ﬂexible anchor).
With roots in psycholinguistic research, the advantage of this clas-
siﬁcation scheme is that it reduces ambiguity in spatial descriptions
of the world (Miller and Johnson-Laird, 1976; Carlson-Radvansky
and Irwin, 1993; Levelt, 1996; Levinson, 2004; Carlson and Van
Deman, 2008). For example, when describing the location of a
coffee cup, one may say, “the cup is in front of me (observer self)”
(in EFOR); “the cup is on the desk” (in AFOR); or “the cup is
in front of John” (in IFOR). Note that, while both AFOR and
IFOR use an external anchor, the anchor in AFOR (the desk in this
case) is more stable than IFOR (John in this case, who can freely
change his location or orientation). Our interest in IFOR is moti-
vated by vision and spatial memory research that emphasizes the
dynamic updating of object-centered representations (Marr, 1982;
Wang et al., 2005a; Mou et al., 2008; Sun and Wang, 2010; Chen
and McNamara, 2011). In this respect, the interactions between
EFOR and IFOR (e.g., the intertwined representations of self-
other-object relationship) are ubiquitous in everyday tasks, where
the “other” can be either an anchoring object (Wang et al., 2005b;
Tamborello et al., 2012), or another agent or human being as in
social situations (Mitchell, 2006; Kessler and Rutherford, 2010;
Kessler and Thomson, 2010; Perner et al., 2011).
One fundamental distinction among different FOR-based rep-
resentations is the manner in which each representation handles
temporal instability during the interactions between the mind
and the environment. Temporal instability manifests itself as
both spatial and temporal variances during the encoding of
spatio-temporal relationships between various entities in the
environment (e.g., self, agents, objects, locations, and events).
Different reference systems partition these variances in different
manners and therefore afford structures at different levels of insta-
bility. In the “coffee cup” example, the spatial relations among
relevant entities can change over time. To locate the coffee cup, an
EFOR representation from the observer’s perspective is relatively
stable, to the extent that the anchor is always the “observer self.”
In contrast, an IFOR representation of the coffee cup anchored
to John is unstable because John can freely move around and the
observer is therefore required to track both the coffee cup and John
in order to maintain an IFOR representation.
Critically, temporal instability evokes predictive learning. Sim-
ply put, whereas temporal instability means that the current input
is expected to change at the next time point, predictive learning
is a process of spatio-temporal integration in which the internal
representation is constructed by remapping attention toward the
expected outcomes (Hawkins and Blakeslee, 2004; O’Reilly et al.,
2012). It has been suggested that predictive learning is a driv-
ing force in learning structured abstractions of the environment
(Hawkins and Blakeslee, 2004; Krauzlis and Nummela, 2011; Rolfs
et al., 2011; Gerstner et al., 2012; O’Reilly et al., 2012). Consider
the coffee cup example again: predictive learning takes the antic-
ipated movements into consideration and produces a dynamic
representation of the relevant spatial relations. When an observer
is reaching for a coffee cup, predictive learning occurs within
EFORs, such that the coffee cup’s location is updated relative to
the observer’s hand or body. By making constant predictions, the
observer would know when to grab even before her hand touches
the cup. When the observer watches John reaching for the coffee
cup, predictive learning involves IFORs, such that the coffee cup’s
location is updated relative to John. Yet, should John suddenly
change his course and pick up another object (e.g., a stapler), the
observer would be surprised as John’s initial movements led to an
expectation that he would pick up the coffee cup instead of the
stapler.
That the mind uses different FOR to manage temporal insta-
bility and drive spatio-temporal association is consistent with an
accumulating body of neurological and behavioral studies (Marr,
1982; Krauzlis andNummela, 2011; Pertzov et al., 2011; Rolfs et al.,
2011; Van Der Werf et al., 2013). To further illustrate this notion,
consider an example from the two-cannon experiment reported
by Tamborello et al. (2012). In their experiment (Figure 1), partic-
ipants were instructed to use the arrow keys to rotate the cannon
in the same color of a to-be-revealed target as quickly as possible,
so that the cannon could point to (and shoot at) the target. Three
different types of reference systems can be used to describe the tar-
get location (Figure 1A). In an EFOR representation (relative to
the observer), the target is at the front-top of the observer’s visual
ﬁeld (the observer’s line of sight was perpendicular to the plane
of the computer screen). In an AFOR representation, the target
can be described in reference to the computer screen frames. In
an IFOR representation (relative to a cannon), the target has a
counterclockwise bearing relative to the orientation of the blue
cannon (or a clockwise bearing relative to the red cannon). Math-
ematically, all of these representations are equivalent, to the extent
that one representation can be transformed into another without
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org February 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 58 | 2
Sun andWang Intrinsic frame of reference
FIGURE 1 | (A) A schematic illustration of the two-cannon task reported by
Tamborello et al. (2012). In the experiment, participants (“observers”) were
sitting in front of a computer (the observer’s line of sight was perpendicular to
the plane of the computer screen). (B) Actual task displays in the experiment.
At the beginning of each trial, two cannons (one red and one blue) and
multiple pellets (in either red or blue) were presented together on the
computer screen. After a one-second pause, a randomly selected pellet would
ﬂash as the target. The participants’ task was to use the arrow keys to rotate
the cannon in the same color of the target toward the target as quickly as
possible. The cannons’ orientations and the ratio between the number of red
and blue pellets were varied across trials. The angles between two cannons
were either “conﬂict-absent” (zero degree) or “conﬂict-present” (90 or 180◦).
losing any information. However, in terms of efﬁcient and ﬂexible
removal of task-irrelevant variance, different representations are
unique in the way they are updated and maintained.
Let us ﬁrst examine temporal instability. It is clear that both
EFOR and AFOR representations have relatively ﬁxed anchors
(e.g., the observer and the computer monitor frames, respec-
tively). In contrast, IFOR is only tentatively anchored to one of
the two cannons: the color and location of the target is initially
unknown, thus, which cannon is task-relevant depends on the
visual input at the next time point. Recall that temporal instability
evokes predictive learning, in which internal representations of
the environment are constructed based on the current observa-
tions toward the expected future outcomes. In this case, the color
ratio of the pellets provides a reliable cue for predicting the rel-
evancy between two competing cannons. Figure 2A shows that
reaction times in the conﬂict-present condition (cannons point-
ing to different directions) were signiﬁcantly slower than those in
the conﬂict-absent condition (cannons pointing to the same direc-
tion). Within the conﬂict-present conditions, the cannon in the
same color of the majority pellets resulted in faster reaction times.
These results indicate that in resolving the conﬂict between dif-
ferent IFOR representations, participants planned their responses
by predicting the task-relevant cannon based on the pellet color
ratio. That is, prediction occurs before the appearance of an actual
target, leading to a stronger IFOR representation anchored to the
task-relevant cannon, thus resulting in faster reaction times.
Second, in order to achieve computational efﬁciency and ﬂexi-
bility,multiple IFOR representationsmay coexist and interact with
eachother. Figure 2A shows that evenwhenparticipantsmade cor-
rect predictions on the task-relevant cannon in the conﬂict-present
condition, their reaction times were still signiﬁcantly slower than
that in the conﬂict-absent condition. This indicates that, while
anticipating the upcoming target, the competition between two
conﬂicting IFOR representations resulted in a partial dissociation.
That is, as the IFOR representation anchored to the predicted task-
relevant cannon was the focus of attention, the other one was only
partially disengaged – a strategy of prioritizing but still preparing
for the unexpected. As a result, even when the prediction was cor-
rect, the partially disengaged IFOR representation interfered with
performance and produce longer reaction times.
Third, an interaction may also occur between EFOR and IFOR
representations. Figure 2B shows that reaction times were signif-
icantly dependent on the angular disparity between the self and
cannonorientations, indicating a strategy of combining EFORand
IFOR representations, or perspective taking. Perspective taking has
been considered as an important stepping stone from automatic
and unaware perception toward a conscious and deliberate pro-
cess in which people mentally perform a movement simulation of
other people or objects (Kessler and Rutherford, 2010; Kessler and
Thomson, 2010; Zwickel et al., 2011). Here, we consider perspec-
tive taking in terms of partitioning the statistical variances in the
task environment.
Speciﬁcally, for a given cannon, we consider three parts of
the spatial variances (angular disparities) that could be men-
tally encoded: self-cannon, self-target, and cannon-target. Since
the correct response is determined by the cannon-target vari-
ance, it requires either a complete or a partial disengagement
of the EFOR representation. If the EFOR representation is to be
completely disengaged (i.e., removing self-target and self-cannon
variances), the task could be accomplished by object rotation based
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FIGURE 2 | Results fromTamborello et al. (2012). (A) Reaction times as
function of target color, conﬂict between two cannons, and the color ratio in
surrounding pellets. Across three sequentially presented blocks of trials, the
surrounding pellets varied from trials of more blue pellets (B:R = 6:2) to trials
of more red pellets (B:R = 2:6). Reaction times in the “conﬂict-absent”
conditions (two cannons pointing to the same direction) were signiﬁcantly
faster than that those in the “conﬂict-present” conditions (90 or 180◦
between two cannons). Within the “conﬂict-present” conditions, reaction
times were signiﬁcantly faster for the cannon in the same color of the
majority pellets, indicating the effect of expectation, where participants had
made predictions on the task-relevant cannon before the appearance of the
actual target. (B) Reaction time was dependent on the angular disparity
between the participants’ “up” and the target cannon orientations
(self-cannon variance), indicating an interaction between EFOR and IFOR
representations, namely, the effect of perspective taking. Note that since
participants were always facing the computer screen, their “up” was
congruent with the “up” on the computer screen. In both ﬁgures, error bars
depict standard error of the mean.
only on an IFOR representation. However, the reaction time pat-
tern in Figure 1B suggests a case of partial EFOR disengagement:
the task was accomplished by self rotation with perspective tak-
ing, in which the self-cannon variance was ﬁrst removed so that
the self-target variance became exactly the same as the cannon-
target variance. Similar to the interaction between multiple IFOR
representations, the interaction between EFOR and IFOR repre-
sentations also serves the purpose of both computational efﬁciency
and ﬂexibility. On the one hand, an IFOR representation is parsi-
monious in encoding only task-speciﬁc variances (e.g., encoding
only the target-cannon but not the self-cannon, the self-target
relations). On the other hand, an EFOR representation tend to
be automatic and effortless (Wang and Spelke, 2002; Frith and
Frith, 2007; Kessler and Thomson, 2010). Therefore, an efﬁcient
and ﬂexible solution would be to combine EFOR and IFOR rep-
resentations into one representation. That is, instead of utilizing
a purely IFOR-based strategy in which the cannon is mentally
rotated toward the target (i.e., object rotation), participants might
superimpose their egocentric perspective onto the cannon – that
is, take the perspective of the cannon – then mentally self-rotate
toward the target.
Overall, this new interpretation of the two-cannon experi-
ment results suggests that expectation-driven competitions can
take place not only between different IFOR representations
(Figure 2A), but also between EFOR and IFOR representations
(Figure 2B). By this account, the internal spatial representation of
the environment is always dynamically constructed and updated
toward the anticipated outcomes, rather than static associations
of the current spatial conﬁguration. Depending on whether there
are conﬂicts between representations and whether the actual
outcome meets the expectation, competition takes place at dif-
ferent levels and results in the engagement and disengagement of
different FOR-based representations. In the following section, we
demonstrate that the same mechanisms may well lay the foun-
dation for more complex representations in the domain of social
cognition.
INTRINSIC FRAME OF REFERENCE IN BELIEF ATTRIBUTION
A landmark ﬁnding in belief attribution is that ﬁfteen-month-old
infants appear to be able to appeal to other’s beliefs, that is, they
were able to keep track of an actor’s perception about the location
of a toy, and, using this perception rather their own, to predict
the actor’s searching behavior (Onishi and Baillargeon, 2005).
This ﬁnding has triggered a substantial debate over the question
whether the theory-of-mind abilities evolved from “actor-object-
location associations” (Perner and Ruffman, 2005, p. 215), or
are due to an innate mechanism specialized for belief attribution
(Leslie, 2005; Baillargeon et al., 2010). Here we offer a reinterpre-
tation of the original ﬁndings based on the same spatio-temporal
association account outlined above.
Figure 3 re-produces the experimental setup and results from
Onishi and Baillargeon (2005). Note that we have re-labeled the
experimental conditions by replacing the original object labels
with location labels from the actor’s perspectives: “green box”
replaced by “L” (actor’s left-hand side), and, “yellow box” replaced
by “R” (actor’s right-hand side). Hence, our new labels are essen-
tially placeholders for representing different locations. However,
thenew labels alsohighlight the spatial component of the task envi-
ronment and potential interference between the different FOR.
Similar to the two-cannon experiment, this task involves the
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org February 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 58 | 4
Sun andWang Intrinsic frame of reference
FIGURE 3 |The experimental setup and results, re-produced based
on Onishi and Baillargeon (2005). Conditions have been renamed by
replacing the original labels “green box” and “yellow box” with location
labels “L” and “R”, respectively (“L” and “R” indicate the toy’s location
from the actor’s perspective). The experiment consisted of three phases:
(1) “familiarization”, (2) “belief induction”, and (3) “test”. During (1),
infants (“observer”) watched the actor reaching toward a box for a toy
at one of two locations (boxes are not shown here). At the end of this
phase, the toy was located on the actor’s left-hand side. In (2), infants
were assigned to one of four conditions, in which they watched some
movements of the boxes or the toy in the actor’s presence or absence.
Here we used dyadic labels to represent the validity of the actor’s
belief (“TB” for true belief and “FB” for false-belief) and the location of
the toy last known to the actor from the actor’s perspective (“L” for
the left-hand side and “R” for the right-hand side). In addition, arrows
represent movements of the box or the toy; colored toy and solid lines
indicate the actor’s true belief about the toy’s location; grayed toy and
dotted lines represent the actor’s false-belief as the location of the toy
was changed in her absence. In the “TB-L” condition, the toy remained
at the actor’s left-hand side and only the box at the actor’s right-hand
side was moved toward the toy then back to its original location. In
the “TB-R” condition, the toy was moved from the actor’s left to her
right in her presence. In the “FB-L” condition, the toy was last seen by
the actor at her left but was moved to her right in her absence. In the
“FB-R” condition, the toy was moved from the actor’s left to her right
in her presence but moved back to her left in her absence. In test
phase (3), infants watched the actor reaching one of the locations for
the toy and their average looking times were recorded and analyzed.
Here we use triadic labels to represent each test condition, with the
ﬁrst two parts repeating the label for the corresponding belief induction
condition, and the last part representing the direction where the actor
reached for the toy. The equality between the last two parts represents
whether there is a conﬂict between the IFOR representation at the end
of the belief induction phase and the one in the test phase. For
example, “TB-L-L” represents the condition in which the actor held a
true belief that the toy was at her left-hand side and she actually
reached the same location for the toy (“no conﬂict”); In comparison,
“TB-L-R” represents the condition in which the actor held a true belief
that the toy was at her left-hand side but she actually reached her
right-hand side for the toy (“conﬂict”). Infants’ looking times (mean and
standard errors in seconds) in each test condition are shown on the
rightmost panel.
interplay of multiple representations. For example, the toy’s loca-
tion can be described in EFOR (relative to the observer, which is
the infant in the experiment), AFOR (relative to the table or the
room), or IFOR (relative to the actor). According to the origi-
nal object labels, the toy’s location was described by the color of
the box, which was the same to both the infant and the actor. In
contrast, as the infant was facing the actor, the “left” and “right”
labels were completely opposite, depending on whether they were
from the infant’s perspective (EFOR) or from the actor’s per-
spective (IFOR). Therefore, the new labels were more effective
in distinguishing EFOR and IFOR representations.
COMPARISON WITHIN BELIEF INDUCTION CONDITIONS
The main ﬁnding by Onishi and Baillargeon (2005) involved
comparing the infants’ looking times between the two “test” con-
ditions within each of the four “belief induction” conditions.
They reported that looking times were shorter when the actor
reached for the toy where she believed it was located (“no conﬂict”
conditions in Figure 3) and longer when the actor reached the
opposite location (“conﬂict” conditions). Based on this compari-
son, the authors concluded that infants were able to use the actor’s
belief state instead of the actual toy location from infants’ own
perspective to predict the actor’s reaching behavior.
Rather than resorting to an innately dedicated belief attribution
mechanism, we would like to offer a different explanation based
on fundamental spatial information processing mechanisms. Our
interpretations is that belief attribution derives from the proper
maintenance of and dissociation betweenmultiple representations
based on EFOR (for encoding self-toy or self-actor relations) and
IFOR (for encoding actor-toy relations). In particular, it has been
suggested that infants’ looking time provides a measurement of
surprise, such that longer looking times indicate greater viola-
tion of infants’ expectations relative to their prior knowledge or
greater novelty relative to their interpretation of habituation stim-
uli (Baillargeon, 1986; Onishi and Baillargeon, 2005; Téglás et al.,
2011). Here we argue that for the false-belief task by Onishi and
Baillargeon (2005) surprise might have resulted from the violation
of infant’s expected spatial conﬁguration relative to the actual one.
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Our earlier argument suggests that, among all possible FOR-based
representations, those leading to task-relevant predictions tend to
be actively updated and maintained. Since the looking times were
about the actor’s reaching for the toy, both the expected and actual
spatial conﬁgurations would be encoded in the form of IFOR
representations (actor-toy), rather than irrelevant EFOR represen-
tations (infant-toy). In other words, the IFOR-based expectation
reﬂects a simple behavioral rule by means of spatial association –
people (the actor) look for objects at their last known location
(Ruffman and Perner, 2005). Consequently, the difference in look-
ing times between “conﬂict” and “no conﬂict” conditions may be
explained by the effort of resolving the discrepancy between the
IFOR representation at the end of the belief induction phase, rela-
tive to the actual IFOR representation in the test phase. Results in
Figure 3 support this explanation by showing that, in each of the
four belief conditions, looking times were reliably longer (with
a mean difference always around 7∼9 s) when there was a con-
ﬂict between the IFOR representations at the end of the induction
phase (the same as the expectation) and in the test phase (the
actual outcome). For example, looking times for “x-L-R” condi-
tions were consistently longer than those for “x-L-L” conditions
(“x” stands for either “TB” or “FB”, and, a conﬂict is present if the
last two alphabets are different).
COMPARISON BETWEEN BELIEF INDUCTION CONDITIONS
It is apparent from Figure 3 that there were differences in looking
times among the four belief induction conditions. For example,
whereas the FB-L condition had the longest looking times, the
FB-R condition had similar looking times as those in TB condi-
tions. It is surprising that these differenceswere notmentionednor
accounted for by Onishi and Baillargeon (2005). Using the same
argument in the two-cannon task, we speculate that the look-
ing time difference between belief induction conditions might
also be due to the interference from a partially disengaged rep-
resentation. In this case, there could be different levels of the
dissociation between EFOR and IFOR representations due to the
different sequences of temporal events during the belief induction
phase. Based on the comparison between “test” conditions above,
it appears that the surprise effect (i.e., “conﬂict” versus “no con-
ﬂict”) in all belief induction conditions remained approximately
constant (7∼9 s). This implies that the variance in looking times,
less the surprise effect, would be independent of the predictions
by the actor-toy IFOR representation. Accordingly, the remaining
variance in looking times could be due solely to the interference
from the infant-toy EFOR representation.
In the following, we use the conditional means and standard
errors reported in the original study to make three sets of post
hoc comparisons across different belief induction conditions but
within the same “conﬂict” or “no conﬂict” test conditions (e.g., x-
L-L compared with x-R-R, x-L-R compared with x-R-L, and etc.).
First, the mean looking times were about the same in the TB-L
and TB-R conditions (i.e., TB-L-L ≈ TB-R-R, and, TB-L-R ≈
TB-R-L), despite different manipulation sequences in the belief
induction phase – the former (TB-L) only involved the movement
of an empty container (the “yellow box” on the actor’s left hand
side) and the latter (TB-R) involved the change of the toy’s location
(see Figure 3). This indicates that the looking times were primarily
determined by the active maintenance of the IFOR representation
of the actor-toy relationship. If there was any interference from
the EFOR representation of the infant-toy relationship, the effect
remained constant between these two conditions.
Second, the mean looking times were signiﬁcantly longer in the
FB-L condition than in the TB-R condition (i.e., FB-L-L> TB-R-
R, mean difference ≈ 8 s; FB-L-R > TB-R-L, mean difference ≈
9 s; two tailed p < 0.05 in both comparisons). Such differences
could be accounted for by stronger interference from the EFOR
representation in the FB-L condition than in the TB-R condi-
tion. Speciﬁcally, the change of the toy’s location was visible
only to the infant in the FB-L condition but visible to both the
infant and the actor in the TB-R condition. Thus, the infant-toy
EFOR representation in the FB-L condition would be relatively
stronger (more engaged). Being task-irrelevant (e.g., irrelevant to
the actor’s fetching action), the stronger EFOR representation in
the FB-L condition would lead to greater interference, resulting in
longer looking times during the test phase.
Third, the mean looking times were signiﬁcantly shorter in the
FB-R condition than in the FB-L condition (i.e., FB-L-L> FB-R-R,
mean difference ≈ 7 s; FB-L-R > FB-R-L, mean difference ≈ 7 s;
one tailed p < 0.05 in both comparisons). Interestingly, despite
the more complicated manipulation sequences in the FB-R con-
dition, looking times were about the same as those in the true
belief conditions (TB-L and TB-R). Consistent with the afore-
mentioned explanation, it is likely that the IFOR representation in
the FB-R condition became stronger when it was reinforced in the
presence of the actor (the actor last saw the toymoving to her right-
hand side). By competition, a stronger IFOR representation led to
a weaker EFOR representation. Although both were false-belief
conditions, the weaker EFOR representation in the FB-R condi-
tion resulted in less interference and, therefore, shorter looking
times than the FB-L condition.
In summary, it appears that FOR-based representations may
provide a more transparent and detailed explanation to the ﬁnd-
ings reported by Onishi and Baillargeon (2005). In contrast to
the two-cannon experiment by Tamborello et al. (2012), this false-
belief task was not explicitly designed to detect the EFOR–IFOR
interaction (e.g., infants were always facing the actor with the
same bearing). Therefore, the interpretation of our post hoc com-
parisons between belief induction conditions could be limited.
Nevertheless, our interpretation remained consistent across all
comparisons and across both tasks. That is, in order to track and
predict other agent’s behavior, the internal process would involve
at least a partial disengagement of EFOR representations, an active
engagement of IFOR representations, and, potential interference
between EFOR and IFOR representations.
Note that our interpretation is in the same vein as the “actor-
object-location association” account (Perner and Ruffman, 2005).
In addition, we identify the role of EFOR–IFOR dissociation.
This interpretation is along the same line as the proposals that
belief attribution may evolve from low-level spatial encoding pro-
cesses, including the identiﬁcation of “external referent” (Perner
et al., 2011) and perspective taking (Kessler and Rutherford, 2010;
Kessler and Thomson, 2010). Similar to the original interpreta-
tion by Onishi and Baillargeon (2005), here we also emphasize the
role of expectation. However, expectation in our account is not
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the end product of belief attribution. Rather, it starts early at the
level of FOR-based spatial representations. In this respect, belief
representation emerges as themind integrates different spatial rep-
resentations at different time points by reducing the discrepancy
between the actual and the expected outcomes.
FROM SPATIAL TO SOCIAL: THE COMMON NON-COGNITIVE
ORIGINS
Although we have demonstrated that the same language from spa-
tial cognition may be used to interpret infants’ performance in
the false-belief task, we do not claim that social cognitive abili-
ties can be completely accounted for by those in spatial cognition.
Moreover, we do not claim a parallel between an explicit spatial
orientation task and 15-month-old infants’ preferential looking
task. Rather, we focus on the common representations underlying
these two seemingly different tasks. We argue that abilities from
both spatial and social domains share common non-cognitive ori-
gins at the level of spatio-temporal association in extracting the
environmental statistics. Ergo, these abilities, even if they appear
different from each other, may not be domain-speciﬁc per se, but
reﬂect the different requirements in computational efﬁciency and
ﬂexibility.
In bridging the conceptual gaps between spatial and social cog-
nitive abilities, it is critical to understand the common dynamic
nature of spatio-temporal association in both domains. In the
present paper, we have shown that, in terms of FOR-based rep-
resentations, the two-cannon task and the false-belief task share
at least three computational properties. First, both tasks require
encoding multiple spatial relations with different reference points
(spatial association); Second, both involve comparisons of repre-
sentations at different time points (temporal association); Third,
the internal representations for both tasks are not static spatial
encodings at isolated time points, rather, they are constructed and
maintained through competitions toward the expected outcomes
(predictive learning). We argue that all these three properties are
governed by the same principle, whether one’s goal is to learn a
spatial conﬁguration or infer other’s intentions and beliefs. That
is, the internal representations are developed in the direction of
reducing spatio-temporal instability (variances) in order to extract
statistical regularities at different levels of abstraction from the task
environment.
Commonly shared computational processes could well be sup-
ported by commonly shared neural implementations. A growing
body of research suggests that brain mechanisms supporting
sophisticated social abilities may derive from low-level processes
such as spatial tracking, predictive encoding, and attention shift-
ing (for reviews, see, Mitchell, 2006; Corbetta et al., 2008; Frith
and Frith, 2012). In the same vein, we argue that the key ingredi-
ent in both spatial and social cognition is the expectation-driven
competition between multiple FOR-based representations, that
are supported by a set of intrinsically distributed neural net-
works, rather than separately dedicated brain mechanisms. In the
following, we discuss the neural evidence that supports this view.
Even a simple task could demand multiple representations of
the task environment at different temporal points. Then, the need
for selection arises at different levels of processing due to the
limitation of resources. On the basis of functional and anatomical
distinctions, a model of attention selection has been proposed,
suggesting that the attentional operations are carried out by the
interactions between two fronto-parietal systems – a dorsal atten-
tion system (also referred to as top-down attention network, or,
canonical sensory-motor pathway) and a ventral attention system
(or, bottom-up attention network; Corbetta and Shulman, 2002;
Corbetta et al., 2008; Yeo et al., 2011). The dorsal system is bilat-
eral and mainly composed of the frontal eye ﬁeld (FEF) and the
intraparietal sulcus (IPS). It is specialized for selecting and linking
stimuli and responses by sending top-down “ﬁltering” signals to
visual areas and via the middle frontal gyrus (MFG) to the ventral
network. The ventral system is right-lateralized and includes the
right temporal-parietal junction (TPJ), the right ventral frontal
cortex (VFC), parts of the MFG, and the inferior frontal gyrus
(IFG). Coordinated by the dorsal system, the ventral system sends
bottom-up “reorienting” signals that interrupt and reset ongoing
activity upon detection of salient targets, especially when there is
a violation of expectation (for reviews, see, Corbetta et al., 2008).
The ﬁltering and reorienting functionality in the dorsal–ventral
attention networks is particularly useful for implementing the
computation of multiple FOR-based representations, particularly
when multiple FORs compete. We consider two levels of compe-
tition: (1) competition within the dorsal pathway (ﬁltering), and
(2), competition carried out by the interaction between the dorsal
and ventral pathway (reorienting). Some evidence suggest that,
along the dorsal pathway, multiple representations in different
FOR can coexist – from lower-level retinotopic representations to
higher-level self-centered (EFOR) and world-centered representa-
tions (IFOR and AFOR), and that the parietal cortex, particularly
the IPS, is central to the construction of these representations
(Marr, 1982; Andersen et al., 1997; Colby and Goldberg, 1999;
Burgess, 2008; Pertzov et al., 2011; Van Der Werf et al., 2013).
Recent rest-state data indicate that the dorsal attention network
follows a serial and hierarchical organization, whereas the func-
tional connectivity of parietal and prefrontal association cortices
appears to be embeddedwith largely parallel and interdigitated cir-
cuits (Yeo et al., 2011). We argue that such an organization would
allow a hierarchical abstraction of the task environment based
on ﬂexible selections among multiple representations. That is, in
terms of FOR-based representations, it is possible that the invari-
ance extracted at early cortical stages (e.g., visual areas and the
parietal cortex) is incomplete, causing different representations to
overlap with one another. In order to support higher-level abstrac-
tions, a more complete dissociation is required at the level of the
prefrontal areas. For instance, it has been suggested that the FEF
region plays a crucial role in the construction of intrinsic reference
frames among multiple objects in spatial tasks (Wallentin, 2012).
Likewise, studies with neural network simulations have shown
that, although partial dissociation between different types of spa-
tial information can occur by re-encoding visual information in
the parietal cortex, dorsal control from the prefrontal cortex is
necessary to achieve a more explicit dissociation (Sun and Wang,
2013); Moreover, efﬁcient and ﬂexible representations of the
changing environment requires the maintenance of both latent
representations (through altered ﬁring thresholds in non-frontal
regions) and active representations (through sustainedﬁring in the
prefrontal cortex) (Morton and Munakata, 2002). It is suggested
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that such a maintenance mechanism is involved when the infants
created actor-object-location associations in the false-belief task
(Perner and Ruffman, 2005).
More dramatic competition between multiple representations
would likely occur when expectations derived from actual sen-
sory input have been violated. In such instances, the ventral
attention network sends out reorienting signals and the dorsal
attention network is reconﬁgured (Corbetta et al., 2008). Evidence
for dorsal–ventral interaction comes fromstudies that use perspec-
tive taking tasks, which typically involve conﬂicting perspectives
in EFOR and IFOR representations. For example, it has been
reported that the transformation from participants’ own perspec-
tive to another agent’s body axis was associated with activations
in posterior parietal cortical regions, such as the left inferior pari-
etal lobe (IPL) and parietal–temporal–occipital junction as well as
the right superior parietal lobe (Vogeley et al., 2004; David et al.,
2006). Additionally, it has been found that TPJ shows enhanced
activities in voluntary orienting of attention when participants are
cued about the future location of a target stimulus (Corbetta et al.,
2000), and when they need to distinguish between self-produced
actions and actions generated by others (Blakemore and Frith,
2003; Jackson and Decety, 2004). Recently,Mazzarella et al. (2013)
reported that responses in right IFG are sensitive to another per-
son’s orientation when participants perform the task from their
own egocentric perspective. Thus, these studies are consistent with
the suggestion that taking another person’s perspective requires
extra effort as compared with using one’s own perspective (Kessler
and Thomson, 2010).
It should be pointed out that among different brain areas, the
TPJ region has been a major topic of debate regarding the neural
mechanisms of belief attribution abilities in social interactions.
Some researchers argue that this region is speciﬁcally involved in
the theory-of-mind functions (Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003; Apperly
et al., 2004; Saxe and Wexler, 2005; Saxe and Powell, 2006; Saxe
et al., 2009; Young et al., 2010). However, the studies mentioned
above suggest that the TPJ’s function is not unique in the social
context. In fact, many theorists consider the TPJ the key hub of
the ventral attention network, which essentially supports atten-
tion reorienting for resolving conﬂicts between different visual
perspectives, especially when there is a violation of the expected
outcomes (Posner et al., 2006; Decety and Lamm, 2007; Mitchell,
2008; Perner and Aichhorn, 2008). Similarly, it has been suggested
that the dorsal part of the TPJ region is involved in representing
different perspectives and making behavioral predictions, whereas
the more ventral part of TPJ and the medial prefrontal cortex
region (MPFC) are responsible for predicting behavioral conse-
quences (Aichhorn et al., 2006). Along the same line, Corbetta
et al. (2008, p. 317) posited that, “Similar environmental and bod-
ily representations and their comparisonmay be co-opted for ToM
interactions and that attention signals in TPJ may be important to
switch between internal, bodily, or self-perspective and external,
environmental, or other’s viewpoint, a key ingredient of ToM.”
In sum, we argue that by supporting different levels of
competition between multiple representations, the functions of
dorsal–ventral attention networks play a major role in both spa-
tial and social cognitive abilities. Whereas the ﬁltering function
manages competition among representations required for the
ongoing activity, the reorienting function facilitates competition
and reconﬁguration when the new sensory input violates the
expectation from the current representations. Crucially, different
levels of competition allow partial engagement (or disengage-
ment) of certain representations, which facilitate the integration
of potentially conﬂicting representations. As mentioned earlier,
maintaining multiple IFOR representations is essential for priori-
tizing while being prepared for the unexpected. Combining EFOR
and IFOR representations (perspective taking) takes advantage
of both the efﬁcient removal of task-irrelevant variance and fast
mental simulation. When infants start to learn by copying others’
actions (Meltzoff, 1995; Tomasello et al., 2005; Nielsen, 2006), it is
important for them to hold both EFOR and IFOR representations
so that imitation and emulation are possible.
SUMMARY
The central theme in our proposal is that the complex achieve-
ments in either spatial cognition or social cognition may rely on
the fundamental processes of spatio-temporal integration and,
moreover, that there is a set of distributed brain regions shared
by both types of cognition. In our framework, both spatial
and social abilities arise in the form of spatio-temporal asso-
ciation in which the mind constantly deals with the temporal
instability in the environment by predictive learning. In the
effort of extracting statistical regularities, the internal represen-
tations evolve by ﬁrst partitioning the environmental variances
– namely, developing FOR-based representations – then, encod-
ing statistical invariance at different levels of abstractions. Since
the statistical regularities include not only the spatial relations
of static conﬁgurations but also the temporal relations between
sequential events, predictive learning links various representa-
tions with different anchors (spatial integration) at different time
points (temporal integration). Together, abstract knowledge of
the environment (including those about other’s beliefs and inten-
tions) emerges from the expectation-driven competitions among
multiple FOR-based representations.
In our view, different abilities are not domain-speciﬁc per se,
rather, they are subject to the competing demands of computa-
tional efﬁciency and ﬂexibility, yet are bounded by the statistical
structures in the environment. By reinterpreting the results from
the two-cannon experiment (Tamborello et al., 2012) and the false-
belief task (Onishi and Baillargeon, 2005) and reviewing recent
neurocognitive ﬁndings, we advocate an integrated approach that
connects low-level perceptual processes, such as spatial represen-
tations, with high-level functions such as belief reasoning. The
advantage of this approach is that, rather than singling out a cer-
tain brain system for a certain set of cognitive abilities (e.g., the TPJ
for belief reasoning), we can pursue a better understanding of the
mind–environment interaction over a developmental continuum.
For example, the FOR-based account proposed here largely relies
on the mechanisms of attentional network in spatial cognition,
which have been extensively studied on from non-human ani-
mals to human infants and adults (for reviews, see, Corbetta and
Shulman, 2002; Posner et al., 2006; Corbetta et al., 2008; Kavšek,
2013). Thus, this account may provide not only a transparent
partitioning of the environmental statistics, but also potential
explanations for the relationship between different abilities and
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the development of speciﬁc attentional networks. For instance, it
has been suggested that “rudimentary executive attention capaci-
tiesmay emerge during the ﬁrst year of life but thatmore advanced
conﬂict resolution capacities are not present until 2 years of age”
(Posner et al., 2006, p. 1425). This line of reasoning could explain
why young infants suddenly appear to comprehend the complex
world and pass various spatial tasks (McCrink and Wynn, 2007;
Surian et al., 2007; Kovács et al., 2010; Gweon and Schulz, 2011;
Téglás et al., 2011).
Legend has it that in formulating his theory of gravitation,
Newton was inspired by observing the acceleration of an apple
falling from a tree. Subsequently, he inferred the existence of
gravity and extended the effect from to the top of the tree to
the Moon (White, 1991). Perhaps more interestingly, Newton also
ﬁrst stated the principle of relativity (later modiﬁed by Einstein),
which essentially claims that observations of the physical world
depend on the particular “frame of reference” (Feynman et al.,
1963, p. 162). Although we may never know the exact details of his
revelation, the “apple incident” exempliﬁes how early perceptual
analyses are triggered by temporal instability in the environment
and the resulting extraction of statistical regularities with various
reference points. In addition, it illuminates recent proposals that
complex achievements such as mathematics and geometry, which
are uniquely human in their full linguistic and symbolic realiza-
tion, rest nevertheless on a set of core knowledge systems that are
driven by the representations of object, space, time and number
(Spelke and Kinzler, 2007; Spelke et al., 2010), and, knowledge
structures emerge from non-cognitive processes by dynamic asso-
ciations (McClelland et al., 2010). While controversies still exist
between seemingly diverging perspectives, we take the primary
theme of the debates to be the converging efforts of seeking for the
cognitive or non-cognitive origins of human thinking and reason-
ing abilities. If we subscribe to the notion of “bounded rationality”
(Simon, 1982), both spatial and social abilities are bounded by the
learning agent’s computation capacity and the structure of the
environment. In order to bridge the conceptual gaps between spa-
tial and social cognition, the key is to understand the interactions
between“genetic endowment and the environment”(Ruffman and
Perner, 2005, p. 462).
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